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Ezequiel Monti (Torcuato di Tella) – On the Moral Impact Theory of Law (Analytical Legal Philosophy Conference, Surrey))
26 May 2021, 4:00 PM–6:00 PM BST
The Surrey Centre for Law and Philosophy is delighted to host a special session of the Analytical Legal Philosophy Conference (ALPC). On Wednesday, May 26, 4-6pm (GMT), Ezequiel Monti (Universidad Torcuato di Tella) will present his paper ‘On the Moral Impact Theory of Law’, originally selected for the 2020 ALPC at the University of Pennsylvania. The format is pre-read, but everyone is welcome to join. Please register via the following link, where you will also find links to the paper and to the Zoom session: www.eventbrite.co.uk/
Abstract: Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way (Moral Impact Theory of Law [MITL]). Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Second, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness.
Ezequiel Monti is Assistant Professor at Torcuato Di Tella University, School of Law. He obtained his law degree at the University of Buenos Aires (with honours), an MJur (Distinction) at the University of Oxford, and a PhD in Legal Philosophy at King’s College London. He is interested in legal, moral, and political philosophy. His most recent work focuses on the nature of obligations and authority, the normativity of conventions, and the nature and grounds of legal facts. He has recently published “Against Triggering Accounts of Robust Reason-Giving” (Philosophical Studies) and “On Darwall’s Case Against the Normal Justification Thesis” (Ethics).